The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands: in the public or private interest? by Faure, M.G. & Philipsen, N.J.
  
 
The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the
Netherlands: in the public or private interest?
Citation for published version (APA):
Faure, M. G., & Philipsen, N. J. (2002). The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands: in
the public or private interest? Journal of Consumer Policy, 25, 155-201.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016092231002
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2002
DOI:
10.1023/A:1016092231002
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 ABSTRACT. The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands is analysed
in order to test the rent-seeking hypothesis put forward in the private interest litera-
ture. Both the self-regulation issued by the professional bodies and public regulations
are examined. It appears that many regulations in both countries either restrict the entry
into the profession or restrict competition within the profession. A qualitative com-
parative analysis of these regulations in both countries is presented as well as some
empirical findings. The economic analysis and the empirical data seem to give some
support to the rent-seeking hypothesis.
Many professions such as lawyers, architects, and doctors are subject
to self-regulation by public professional bodies. This self-regulation
may on the one hand restrict entry into the profession and limit com-
petition within the profession, while on the other hand it may improve
the quality of professional services. It merits a careful analysis whether
the regulations by and of the professions can be considered to be
“in the public interest” or predominantly serve private goals. 
In this paper we select as a case study the market for (commu-
nity) pharmacists. We present the first results from a comparative
law and economics analysis of the regulation of pharmacists in two
countries, viz., the Netherlands and Belgium. The central question
in our research is the following: To what extent can the regulation
of the pharmaceutical market in these countries be explained as a result
of rent-seeking behaviour by pharmacists or other interest groups?
In addition we are interested in the success of the rent seeking (if any).
Therefore we would like to investigate whether differences in regu-
lation between the two countries might – to some extent – explain
the effectiveness of the rent seeking by pharmacists. Hence our paper
fits both into the public choice tradition and into the (rather recent)
comparative law and economics approach (for an extensive discussion
of the public interest and private interest theories within this litera-
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ture, see, e.g., Ogus, 1994, Chs. 3 and 4; Posner, 1974, pp. 336–342;
Van den Bergh, 1993, pp. 33–42).
The reason we have chosen Belgium and the Netherlands for our
analysis is that, although it concerns two neighbouring countries, the
regulation and the number of pharmacists are very different. Hence,
it is particularly interesting to compare these two regimes within a
comparative law and economics approach. It will allow us to examine
whether the difference in the market structure of pharmacies in the
two countries is related to the varying scope of the regulation.
Moreover, it is interesting to focus on these two – rather different –
legal regimes since similar approaches towards the regulation of phar-
macies can be found in other European legal systems as well. Hence,
we expect that the findings have some relevance also outside the
Belgian-Dutch context.
We should make it clear from the outset that the analysis in this
paper is limited to certain aspects of the regulation of pharmacies.
We do not examine price levels of pharmaceuticals in Belgium and
the Netherlands, for example, and the influence of health insurers is
only briefly addressed. These elements can be included in subse-
quent research.
The paper is structured as follows. First we provide an overview
of the regulation of the pharmaceutical market in the Netherlands
and Belgium. Both the self-regulation and the rules issued by public
authorities that restrict (or may restrict) entry into or competition
within the profession will be considered. Specifically, we look at the
following potential restrictions of competition: professional ethics and
rules of conduct issued by the professional body of pharmacists;
registration and title protection; regulation of the establishment of new
pharmacies; and rules on advertising and tariffs. To keep the paper
within reasonable limits we will obviously have to focus on the most
important features of these very extensive regulations. In the second
part of the paper we will present the results from a qualitative com-
parative analysis of the regulation of pharmacists in the two countries,
in the light of the economic approaches of the public and the private
interest. We also give the first results from an empirical analysis of
the number of pharmacists and the income of pharmacists in the
Netherlands and Belgium. In the final section some concluding
remarks and suggestions for further research are presented.
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THE REGULATION OF PHARMACISTS IN THE NETHERLANDS
Professional code and rules of conduct. The professional organiza-
tion of pharmacists in the Netherlands is called the KNMP, which
stands for the Royal Dutch Association for the Advancement of
Pharmacy (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij ter bevordering der
Pharmacie). The KNMP issued its new Professional Code and Rules
of Conduct for Pharmacists in 1993. Over 90% of all Dutch phar-
macists are member of the KNMP, so the range of the self-regulation
is very wide (KNMP, 1998, p. 6).
Apart from the Professional Code and Rules of Conduct, the KNMP
also enacted the so-called Dutch Pharmacy Standards (Nederlandse
Apotheek Norm) in 1996. The Dutch Pharmacy Standards have been
enacted to work out the concept of “proper care” (“verantwoorde
zorg”) from the Care Institutions Quality Act1 and contain provisions
on, e.g., the design of a pharmacy. Just like the Rules of Conduct,
the Dutch Pharmacy Standards have no binding external force (they
bind, in other words, only the members). However, these provisions
can play a role in the medical disciplinary rules. Moreover, the Dutch
Pharmacy Standards are to a large extent included in the individual
contracts between pharmacists and health insurance companies. The
most important provisions of the rules of conduct and the Dutch
Pharmacy Standards will be discussed below, together with the leg-
islation and the jurisprudence. Provisions that restrict competition
between pharmacists will be emphasized.
Registration and Title Protection
The professional monopoly of a pharmacist. The professional
monopoly of pharmacists is determined by the Drug Supply Act
of 1958 (Wet op de Geneesmiddelenvoorziening) and by the
Pharmaceutical Practice Decree of 1963 (Besluit Uitoefening
Artsenijbereidkunst). Article 1 of the Drug Supply Act defines phar-
maceutical practice as the compounding and the dispensing of
medicines. Pharmaceutical practice is according to Article 2.1 reserved
for pharmacists; and under specific conditions also to dispensing physi-
cians, pharmacist’s assistants, and the pharmaceutical industry and
wholesalers. With respect to physicians who want to open a practice
with a pharmacy, Article 6 provides that they may only practice
pharmacy if a pharmacist has not been established either in the munic-
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ipality concerned or in the adjoining municipalities. Moreover, dis-
pensing physicians are not allowed to prepare drugs themselves or
to dispense drugs to patients other than those living in their work area.
Limited competence to practice pharmacy is given to druggists and
food companies, which means that they are permitted only to sell self-
care drugs at special counters. Thus, they are not qualified to deliver
drugs on prescription. Given that only pharmacists may deliver drugs
on prescription, they therefore have a professional monopoly in the
extramural supply of prescribed drugs.
Registration. Before a pharmacist is allowed to practice pharmacy
in the Netherlands, he or she must be registered with the regional
Health Inspectorate (regionale Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg), in
accordance with Article 14 of the Drug Supply Act. A number of
requirements for registration are laid down in the Pharmaceutical
Practice Decree, among them the requirements for the applicant to
submit a pharmacy diploma and a statement of the property (Article
2). Once registered, a pharmacist or dispensing physician may only
practice pharmacy in one pharmacy, according to Article 19 of the
Drug Supply Act.
The Pharmaceutical Practice Decree also contains a prohibition
for the pharmacist to enter into any kind of agreement with respect
to the public dispensing of medicines with physicians, dentists, or
midwives (Article 18). In 1999 a provision, which restricted the entry
of pharmacists to the market, was repealed from this decree, namely
Article 15.2 That article provided that pharmacists were not allowed
to be employed by non-pharmacists. Since the repeal of Article 15,
it has become possible for qualified pharmacists to work in, e.g., a
chemist’s chain. 
Title protection. In November 1997 the Individual Health 
Care Professions Act (Wet op de Beroepen in de Individuele
Gezondheidszorg), hereafter Professions Act, came into force.3 For a
number of health care professions the ban on the unqualified practice
of the profession, which existed in the past, has been substituted by
a system of registration combined with title protection and partial pro-
tection of the profession through a number of so-called reserved
operations (“voorbehouden handelingen”). However, for pharmacists
no reserved operations have been defined in the Professions Act. For
them the protection of the professional monopoly supplied by the Drug
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Supply Act still applies. New is that the formal use of the title “phar-
macist” is now reserved to those who are registered in the register
of the Professions Act. This register is managed by the Minister of
Health, Welfare and Sport.
Article 22 states how the title “pharmacist” (and thus the entry
into the register of the Professions Act) can be obtained. Required
is the possession of a legally obtained certificate. The unqualified
use of the title “pharmacist” or a similar title is subject to punishment.4
In article 23 of the Professions Act the area of expertise of pharma-
cists is defined to be “the performing of acts in the area of
pharmaceutical practice.” To be able to actually practice their pro-
fession, pharmacists registered with the Professions Act still have to
apply to the regional Health Inspectorate, as described earlier in this
section. Registration with the Health Inspectorate will be refused if
the applicant does not have the title “pharmacist.”
The Establishment of Pharmacies
The establishment policy of the KNMP. In the period between 1975
and 1987 the pharmacists’ association’s private establishment
policy applied: the KNMP Establishment Policy Decree (Besluit
Vestigingsbeleid KNMP). Members had to receive the permission from
the executive board of the KNMP if they wanted to establish or
relocate a pharmacy. These rules were based on the idea that a proper
quality of pharmaceutical aid can only be obtained if the financial
foundation of a pharmacy is financially sound; and that for this a
market of at least 8000 patients per pharmacy is required.5 But the
KNMP has never been able to prevent non-members from establishing
themselves. Suspension and the disqualification from practice can
never be private law disciplinary rules; these are after all matters
pertaining to public law. However, the KNMP can punish with, e.g.,
a warning, a fine, a suspension from the membership of the KNMP,
or the deprivation of the right of being member of a KNMP board
or committee (Leenen, 1991, pp. 261–262).
In theory it is possible to establish a pharmacy without being a
member of the KNMP. This is, however, very difficult in practice
for reasons we will explain below. In the case law of the early 1980s,
the court repeatedly determined in civil law cases that non-members
are not bound by a private law establishment policy.6 The objection
that the establishment policy of the KNMP was a generally acknowl-
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edged code of conduct might have been somewhat true, but this
still cannot make a private rule legally binding. When the number
of “black establishments” increased in the 1980s, the KNMP therefore
changed its establishment policy. From 1987 onwards an advisory
establishment policy without sanctions applies, called the Guidelines
concerning the KNMP advisory establishment policy (Richtlijnen
betreffende het vestigingsadviesbeleid KNMP).
According to these guidelines, the KNMP gives advice about
the establishment, relocation, and closure of pharmacies, at every
member’s request. Also non-members and interested third parties may
ask the KNMP for advice. Besides, the Guidelines even allow the
KNMP to advise on certain issues without being asked. Article 4 of
the Guidelines provides the criterion for positive advice as to estab-
lishment or relocation: “Within an acceptable time the new or relocated
pharmacy must be able to grow to a size that guarantees the 
foundation for a qualitatively good practice of the profession by 
the pharmacist(s). In addition, the conditions for good practice by
the adjacent pharmacies have to be maintained. As a basis the
Minimum Establishment Standard for Pharmacies (Minimum KNMP-
Vestigingsnorm voor Apotheken) shall apply.” In a commentary to
Article 4, it is stated that the above includes that pharmacies have
to be reasonably far apart and that newcomers may only inflict
damage upon established pharmacists as long as this damage is not
“unreasonable.” The KNMP strives for the realization of viable phar-
macies. The above-mentioned Minimum Establishment Standard for
Pharmacies serves as a guideline for assessing the economic feasi-
bility – or the viability – of a pharmacy.
In the assessment, inter alia the following factors are considered:
the expected number of prescriptions, the number of patients, the
turnover, the number of physicians in the area, and infrastructural char-
acteristics. To determine the economic feasibility, first the gross profit
at the expected number of prescriptions is calculated. From this gross
profit the costs of practice (among them personnel and housing costs)
and the investment and financing costs are subtracted, while the
writing-offs are being considered as well. Because the gross profit has
been related to the prescription volume since January 1988, the estab-
lishment standard of the KNMP is also defined in the number of
prescriptions. The standard for economic feasibility of a pharmacy lies
at a structural (minimum) number of prescriptions of 40,000 per year.
No difference is made between prescribed and non-prescribed drugs
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and medical devices.7 The estimate is flexible: The required minimum
for economic feasibility is brought up to date by the KNMP if the
Health Charges Board (CTG) makes an adjustment in the tariffs. If
important market developments are observed by the Foundation for
Pharmaceutical Statistics (Stichting Farmaceutische Kengetallen),
those will also be included in the estimate. Dependent on the geo-
graphical position of the newcomer, additional preconditions apply
in the judgement of economic feasibility, because a distinction is made
between establishment in a rural area with a dispensing physician,
establishment in an urbanised area, and establishment in a demar-
cated new housing estate.
Contracts between pharmacists and health insurers. Although the
advices of the KNMP are not compulsory, the advisory establish-
ment rules of the KNMP are often included in some way in the
contracts between health insurers and pharmacists. Market division
is obviously prohibited by the Dutch Competition Act, and yet the
health insurers draw up agreements with pharmacists or their regional
associations, which have names like “paper concerning the capacity
and the distribution of pharmacists.” It appears from the case law
that these agreements often contain about the same requirements as
the old KNMP Establishment Policy Decree. In one of the cases from
the rather extensive case law in the field of sickness funds, it was
provided in the paper of the sickness fund in question that a phar-
macist’s sphere of activity ought to be larger than 7,500 patients and
that in principle contracts would only be made with a pharmacist-
owner-administrator.8 This is a clear example of market division, yet
the Court decided in this case that there were plausible grounds for
this: a well-considered distribution of care, to be provided by finan-
cially viable pharmacies that are managed rightly. Actually, the
condition that contracts will only be made with a pharmacist-owner-
administrator is also included in the Dutch Pharmacy Standards of
the KNMP: Article 8.1 holds that a pharmacy needs to be governed
by a registered community pharmacist. In the jurisprudence, similar
cases concerning contracts between health insurers and pharmacists
can be found. However, the Dutch Competition Authority (the NMa),
which was founded in January 1998 to look after the new Dutch
Competition Act, seems to be stricter with respect to violations of
the market division prohibition.
The Regulation of Pharmacists 161
Summary. It can be concluded that in practice it is very difficult to
start a new pharmacy. It is hard for a recently established pharma-
cist to make contracts with health insurers in an area that does not
meet the standards enacted by the KNMP. Non-members effectively
have no chance of entry into the market for the simple reason that their
medicines will not be reimbursed by the health insurance (which is
obviously disadvantageous for customers) unless they succeed in
concluding contracts with these health insurers. For pharmacists who
are members of the KNMP it is practically impossible to withdraw
from the advisory establishment policy anyhow: Article 2.13 of the
Professional Code and Rules of Conduct provides that advice by an
authorized KNMP body has to be considered as important. 
Advertising and Design of the Pharmacy
Advertising for pharmacies. Advertising by pharmacists is not regu-
lated by law, as opposed to the advertising of drugs. In the Professional
Code and Rules of Conduct of the KNMP are two articles on this
subject. Article 2.16 provides the following: “A community pharma-
cist is not allowed to approach patients directly and individually, if
these patients are not his own clients. Also he is not allowed to
compare himself with colleagues who are mentioned by name or who
are distinctly indicated.” The other restriction is mentioned in Article
2.23: “Improper competition is prohibited. As such are always 
considered: (a) taking over patients/clients during duty or observa-
tion; (b) actively attracting staff from a neighbouring colleague; (c)
in any way affecting the patients’ free choice of pharmacy.” By the
end of 1997 the Economic Competition Committee (Commissie
Economische Mededinging) had already advised the Minister of
Economic Affairs not to give an exemption from Article 2.16, but
the Committee had approved of Article 2.23a because of the impor-
tance of a well-functioning evening/weekend observance regulation.9
Nevertheless, the KNMP rules of conduct still have not been adapted
accordingly.
It can be concluded that Dutch pharmacists face many difficulties
if they want to show their qualities to patients. Competition in the
quality of supplied services seems only to be possible by providing
extra services to customers, such as home delivery of medicines, or
by offering a broad range of medical supplies and other products
that can be obtained without prescription.
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Design of the pharmacy. The original Articles 32 and 34–36 of the
Pharmaceutical Practice Decree contained some requirements that
pharmacies had to comply with regarding design and accessibility
of the building. These articles were repealed in January 1996, because
they were considered to have “an adverse effect on the efficiency of
the functioning of pharmacies.”10 However, most of these provisions
are now included in the Dutch Pharmacy Standards. Most important
are the following three: a pharmacist must be able to deliver every
sensible prescription; a pharmacy must have a separate room for
magistral preparation of medicines; and the pharmacy must be open
for at least 9 hours between 8 AM and 6 PM and for at least 45
hours a week. 
Tariffs
The price of WTG drugs. In the Netherlands, drugs are divided into
two categories: WTG and non-WTG. WTG drugs are drugs that are
available only at the pharmacy and which therefore fall under the
Health Care Charges Act (Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg, WTG).
Non-WTG drugs may also be supplied in outlets other than pharma-
cies, such as the chemist or sometimes even a supermarket. If supplied
on prescription at the pharmacy, non-WTG drugs may still be covered
by the health insurance, but only under specific conditions. Of all drugs
supplied by community pharmacies on prescription, 85.1% were WTG
drugs in 1998 (SFK, 1999, p. 32). 
The fee pharmacists receive for supplying WTG drugs, called the
fixed fee, is not related to the cost of the product. On the contrary,
the fee is fixed per prescription and does not depend on whether the
medicine costs 5 or 50. The fee also does not depend on the
prescribed amount. The result is that in the Netherlands tariffs for
WTG drugs do not or just barely differ between pharmacies. The
purchase fee, the refund paid by insurers to pharmacists for the dis-
pension of drugs in the pharmacy, is determined by a reimbursement
list in the so-called taxe of Z-index. Z-index belongs to the pharma-
cists’ association KNMP. The taxe is a list of all drugs registered in
the Netherlands and is published every month on the basis of the
CTG11 tariff orders. The CTG tariff orders include the fixed fee per
prescription and the amounts that pharmacists may charge to com-
pensate their purchase costs. In practice this means that the purchase
costs of drugs may be passed on fully by the pharmacist (MDW, 1999,
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p. 67). The taxe of Z-index is the only reimbursement list that satis-
fies the tariff orders of the CTG.
In the taxe the prices as set by the producers are entered. Because
the principle “pharmacy purchase price = pharmacy retail price”
is operated, the producer determines the final retail price of the
drug, thereby taking into account the Drug Prices Act (Wet
Geneesmiddelenprijzen) and the Drug Reimbursement System
(Geneesmiddelenvergoedingssysteem).12 Once a drug has been
included in the taxe, the only room left for the drug producer to
compete by means of the price level is by using the space between
the cost price and the pharmacy purchase price as fixed in the taxe.
This space is used by the producers to provide bonuses and discounts
to pharmacists in order to persuade them to provide their drugs instead
of those of competitors (MinVWS, 1999 b, p. 28) The patient or
insurer does not benefit from these practices. Moreover, insurers are
allowed to deviate from the taxe prices with the reimbursements to
pharmacists, but they hardly do this because of the high administra-
tive troubles attached to a diversity of prices. In the current situation
they only have to deal with one price per drug. By the end of the 1990s
the government gave the fight against bonuses and discounts a promi-
nent place in its drug policy. Since then, pharmacists have been obliged
by the government to pass on some of their rebates by a decrease in
the reimbursement prices of drugs that they may charge (MinVWS,
1999 b, p. 49). This legally determined deduction of the reimburse-
ment price is called “claw back.” 
The pharmacist’s fee. What is now the fee a pharmacist receives for
his services of drug dispensing, customer advice, and looking after
medication surveillance? For every dispensed drug on prescription
he or she receives the fixed fee (receptregelvergoeding), which in 2001
was 12.50 NLG ( 5.67), irrespective of the price or the quantity
of the drug. The fixed fee is updated each year by the CTG. Hereby
the CTG looks especially at developments in the number of dis-
pensed WTG drugs per year. Also there is a substitution measure
that makes up part of the pharmacist’s fee, albeit relatively small
compared to the fixed fee. The substitution measure fits in with the
idea that a prescriber (e.g., a physician or specialist) in principle has
to prescribe under the substance name and not under the brand name.
This so-called incentive measure entails that a pharmacist is allowed
to keep 1/3 of the price difference between a proprietary drug and
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an equivalent parallel-imported or generic drug. The final saving for
the insurer is then twice as high as the incentive revenue of the phar-
macist. However, the price differences between branded and generic
drugs are becoming smaller and smaller by the oppressive effect the
Drug Prices Act and the Drug Reimbursement System exert on the
price level. The possibilities for parallel import therefore decrease
drastically as well. In 1999 it became clear that the government
intended to incorporate the average incentive revenue per prescribed
WTG drug of 0.40 NLG ( 0.18) in the fixed fee.13 Pharmacists are
then more or less obliged to obtain a minimum amount of substitu-
tion. The fixed fee and the incentive measure came into force on
January 1, 1988 (RVZ, 1998, p. 96).
The KNMP claims that the fixed fee has not been adapted suffi-
ciently to the rising pharmacy practice and staff costs, while in addition
the revenues from the incentive measure have decreased as a result
of the levelling of prices of proprietary and generic drugs. The deficits
in the pharmacy budget, which according to many pharmacists have
arisen, have been counterbalanced by bonuses and discounts from
industry and wholesalers. After all, price competition has already
been made virtually impossible as a result of all the government
interference.
To the preceding discussion must be added, for the sake of com-
pleteness, that a pharmacist also receives revenues from the sale of
non-WTG drugs and medical devices. The average profit margin on
these products lies between 20 and 30% (KNMP, 1998, p. 41). Just
like the taxe for WTG drugs, the retail and purchase prices of these
products are included in a list that is issued monthly by the KNMP.
Contrary to the case of WTG drugs, there is some price competition
between pharmacies in this field. However, since the sale of WTG
drugs makes up (by far) the largest part of the turnover in pharma-
cies, it concerns relatively small amounts of money.14 Moreover, in
calculating the fixed fee the CTG takes the average revenues phar-
macists obtain from trade activities other than the sale of WTG drugs
into account as well.
Summary. The conclusion can be kept short. It appears that the pos-
sibilities for pharmacists to compete do not lie in their price policies.
Quite to the contrary, the government regulates the whole market, with
the exception of the relatively much lower revenues of pharmacists
from other trade activities than the sale of WTG drugs.
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THE REGULATION OF PHARMACISTS IN BELGIUM
Professional Code and Rules of Conduct
In Belgium pharmacists are organised in the Order of Pharmacists
(Orde der Apothekers), which was called into being by an Act from
1941. This Act was replaced in 1967 by the Royal Decree no 80
concerning the Order of Pharmacists (Koninklijk Besluit nr. 80 van
10 november 1967 betreffende de Orde der Apothekers), which since
then has contained the most important provisions related to this
Order.15 Three years later a Royal Decree was formulated that spec-
ifies the organisation and the functioning of the boards of the Order.16
Next to the national board of the Order of Pharmacists there are ten
provincial boards, as well as a Dutch-speaking and a French-speaking
Board of Appeal. In a case from 1993 the tasks and competences of
the Order were described as follows: “The Order of Physicians and
the Order of Pharmacists are public institutions that have been
founded by law and who have competences, which are enforced under
the supervision imposed by that law. They have as their duty to watch
over the respect of the ethical rules, as well as the compliance with
the honour, the discretion, the decency and the dignity of the Order
members. They group in a compulsory way all those that practice
the profession of physician or pharmacist.”17
The so-called professional deontology, issued by the Order of
Pharmacists, provides the ethical rules about the practice of the phar-
macist’s profession. Formally, these professional rules have no legal
binding force, no more than the Dutch case of the professional code
and rules of conduct issued by the KNMP. The King of Belgium
does have the possibility to grant binding force to these rules, but until
now this has never happened. The professional deontology was for-
mulated some decades ago by the national board of the Order and
has barely changed in the course of time. The national board of the
Order of Pharmacists can also give advice about matters that are of
interest to pharmacists. Again, this kind of advice has no legally
binding force and therefore cannot contain obligations. Should such
an advice still carry obligations or prohibitions, then it may be sub-
jected to an annulment by the Council of State (Raad van State)
(Balthazar, 1994, p. 114). The most important duties of the provin-
cial boards are approving, postponing, or refusing entries into the
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register of pharmacists (which is kept up to date on the provincial
level), watching over the compliance with the professional rules in the
province, and taking disciplinary measures. Possible sanctions that can
be imposed by the provincial boards of the Order are the following:
warning, censure, reprimand, the suspension of professional practice
for at most two years, and elimination from the register of the Order.18
Next to the Order of Pharmacists there is a federation that
groups all pharmacists on a national level: the Belgian Pharmacists
Association (Algemene Pharmaceutische Bond), hereafter APB. The
APB offers pharmacists and the pharmaceutical sector many services,
such as a drugs data base and a Documentation office, and publishes
several magazines.
In the following sections the effects of the Belgian self-regula-
tion and public regulation on the functioning of the market for
pharmaceutical services will be described.
Registration and Title Protection
The professional monopoly of the pharmacists. The protection of the
professional monopoly of community pharmacists (officina-
apothekers) is laid down in the Royal Decree no 78 from 1967
concerning the practice of medicine, nursing, the paramedical pro-
fessions and the medical committees.19 Article 4 §1 of this decree holds
the following: “No one is allowed to practice pharmacy who does
not have the legal pharmacist’s diploma, obtained according to the
legislation on the assignation of academic degrees and the programme
of the university exams, unless that person is exempted from this by
law.” Dispensing drugs, even if this happens free of charge, is not
allowed if this is done “on a common basis” by someone who does
not meet this criterion. It is also prohibited for non-qualified persons
to prepare drugs, to offer drugs for sale, or to sell them in the retail
trade. The operations reserved for pharmacists are thus listed indirectly
here.20 According to Article 4 §2, under specified conditions physi-
cians, dentists, and veterinary surgeons have a limited competence
to dispense drugs too.
In Belgium, for the dispensing of registered drugs a doctor’s pre-
scription is required, like in the Netherlands.21 However, substitution
of branded drugs by generic drugs is not allowed for pharmacists
(see below). 
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Registration. A pharmacist who has obtained a diploma is not imme-
diately permitted to practice pharmacy. He first has to have his title
formally approved by the Medical Commission (Geneeskundige
Commissie)22 of the province where he is planning to establish himself
and he has to register with the Order of Pharmacists. It is not allowed
to practice medicine and pharmacy at the same time, not even for
holders of both diplomas. Exceptions have been made for dispensing
physicians. The criterion is comparable to the Dutch one: In a region,
a dispensing physician can only establish himself if the geograph-
ical distribution of pharmacies makes it impossible to meet the
requirements of public health. Moreover, physicians who are allowed
to dispense drugs are not allowed to have a public (community)
pharmacy. If a pharmacy is to be established in a region with a dis-
pensing physician, the physician in question has a two year term to
do away with his drug depot. Account is taken of possible mitigating
circumstances.23 However, in practice these rules are not relevant
anymore; there are almost no dispensing physicians left in Belgium
because of the large number of community pharmacies. 
From this it may be concluded that in Belgium the professional
monopoly of the pharmacist is protected by the government. The
practice of pharmacy is subject to a double registration procedure
and the tasks of a pharmacist are clearly, be it indirectly, enumer-
ated. The King, viz., the government, has a large say in the practice
of the pharmacists’ profession. 
Establishment of Pharmacies
The rules for the establishment of pharmacies are formally prescribed
in Belgium. Already in 1967 the basis of these rules was formulated
in the Royal Decree no 78. Article 4 §3 of this decree states: “For
the opening, transferring or merging of community pharmacies a prior
permit is required, granted to one natural or one legal person making
the application. [. . .] The King determines [. . .] the criteria intended
to organise a distribution of the pharmacies.” These criteria have been
worked out in two important decrees: the Royal Decree of 25-9-1974
concerning the opening, transfer and merger of pharmacies open to
the public,24 and the Royal Decree of 13-4-1977 settling the rules
that permit to fix the value of the transfer of pharmacies and to
supervise this transfer.25
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Supervision of the establishment of pharmacies. The Belgian estab-
lishment law can be characterized as an administrative-legal system
of permissions supported by a system of criminal injunction and
sanctions (Nys, 1981–1982, p. 2576). Permissions are given by the
Minister of Health and advice is given by an establishment committee.
The objective of the establishment policy is stimulating public health
by “restricting the number of pharmacies to a maximum for every
municipality” in order to realize a good distribution of pharmacies,
according to Article 1 §1 of the Royal Decree of 1974. The estab-
lishment of new pharmacies is made very difficult by the strict criteria
that are employed. The maximum number of pharmacies in every
municipality depends on the population figure of the municipality con-
cerned (Article 1 §2). Depending on whether the population of the
municipality is at least 30,000, between 7,500 and 30,000, or less than
7,500, the number of pharmacies may not be higher than the quotient
that is the result from the number of inhabitants divided by 3,000,
2,500, and 2,000, respectively. Next to that, §3 contains a series of
distance criteria, which allow a deviation from the population criteria.
That is, the establishment of a pharmacy will also be permitted if
the pharmacy that lies closest to the planned pharmacy is located 1,
3, or 5 kilometres away and covers the needs of 2,500, 2,000, or 1,500
inhabitants, respectively. In practice, the criterion 5 kilometres – 1,500
inhabitants is no longer relevant (Demeester, 1990, p. 118).
The Belgian government feared that the “oversupply” of pharma-
cies would lead to too much competition and less service to patients.
That is why in 1994 the government supplemented the establishment
rules from the Royal Decree of 1974 with a moratorium.26 For a period
of five years, lasting until 8 December, 1999, it was not allowed to
open new pharmacies; only a better distribution of pharmacies in
certain areas was still permitted. This moratorium was renewed in 1999
for a period of as much as ten years. At the same time a registration
procedure for all existing pharmacies was adopted, in order to super-
vise the moratorium more effectively.27
Supervision of the takeover price of pharmacies. The Royal Decree
of 13-4-1977 imposes restraints on the takeover price of a pharmacy.
The implementation of this decree is in the hands of the Minister of
Health. Article 1 §1 dictates that the value of the transfer of a com-
munity pharmacy may not be higher than the sum of three elements:
“1
 
° the furniture and the equipment, estimated by a registered expert;
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2° the stock of products belonging to the pharmacist’s profession, esti-
mated by a registered expert; 3° 150 pc of the average of the gross
profits which have been gained in the course of at most the five taxable
periods preceding that of the transfer.” Yet the limits of the takeover
prices are quite easy to circumvent because the price of the building
is free. After all, in the Royal Decree of 13-4-1977 no account has
been taken of the price of real estate.
Concluding, the same problem exists in Belgium as in the
Netherlands, namely that it is extremely difficult for beginning phar-
macists to capture a place in the market. This is not only a result of
high takeover prices, but also of the tightening of the establishment
act in the form of the moratorium that has been included into the Royal
decree of 25-9-1974. 
Exercise of the Profession
Advertising for pharmacies. In Belgium, the advertising by individual
pharmacists for their practices is supervised by the Order of
Pharmacists on the basis of their professional rules. The second deon-
tological (i.e., professional) rule of the Order of Pharmacists,
formulated in 1951, warns against excessive commercialization of
the profession. It states that, for pharmacists, it is “not deontolog-
ical” to provide, encourage, or tolerate any kind of publicity for the
benefit of their practice. The Order wants to prevent that the honour
and dignity of the pharmacist’s profession is harmed by advertising.
The third professional rule, which was formulated in 1955 and which
contains provisions with regard to unfair competition between phar-
macists, gives a more detailed explanation of this. Article 3.4 of this
rule reads as follows: “A pharmacist is not allowed to advertise in any
form, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of his practice. For instance
by prospectuses, circular letters, by a special typographical style or
special announcements in the phone books, press, radio, cinema, gifts,
travellers, the promise of all sorts of benefits like refunds, discounts,
bonuses etc. . . .”. Finally, Article 1c of the same professional rule
prohibits a pharmacist to “make mention of the soundness of his
products and of the value of his preparations, with the view of making
it seem as if his colleagues make no claim to this quality.”
However, in early 1999 a very important decision was taken by
the Court of Cassation which considerably weakened this supervi-
sory function of the Order.28 In the decision in question, the Court
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of Cassation nullified a decision of the Board of Appeal of the Order
of Pharmacists, in which a disciplinary punishment was imposed on
a pharmacist who distributed carrier bags with the logo of her
pharmacy on them. The Court of Cassation decided that the Order
of Pharmacists is an entrepreneurial association and as such falls under
competition legislation.29 Being an entrepreneurial association, the
Order is not allowed to impose obligations that restrict, prevent, or
distort competition. It is allowed to examine whether the advertising
used is reconcilable with the professional rules of the pharmacist. Only
if by advertising the honour or dignity of the profession is seriously
endangered, such advertising may be prohibited. Thus, in principle
pharmacists are allowed to advertise for their stores.30 With this
decision the Belgian Court of Cassation follows the European trend,
ensuing from the European competition rules. On 23 April, 1999,
the European Commission already decided that the European com-
petition rules with respect to advertising are applicable to the
professions as well. Moreover, this decision not only brings the
Belgian disciplinary procedures in line with the provisions in European
law, but also with the state of affairs in other European countries,
among them the Netherlands.31 In the Netherlands, incidentally, a
similar case occurred already in 1998. The Dutch competition authority
NMa determined on 27 August, 1998, that the KNMvD, the associ-
ation for veterinary surgeons, is an entrepreneurial association falling
under the Dutch Competition Act.32
Design of the pharmacy. In 1965 the Order of Pharmacists issued a
professional rule that has an effect on the design of pharmacies.
In its sixth professional rule concerning the pharmacist’s publicity,
some instructions regarding the design of the pharmacy and the
shop-window (it is for instance prohibited to “display therapeutic
instructions or recommendations in any way on behalf of the public”)
and a ban on provocative neon signs have been formulated. 
Tariffs
The price of drugs. In Belgium the price structure and the distribu-
tion margins in the market for drugs are determined by law, just as
in the Netherlands. The drug prices are determined by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs. Whenever an agreement about the price is
reached with the drug producer, this price is laid down legally.
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Moreover, the Minister of Economic Affairs first has to consider a
recommendation for the prices by the Drug Board (Geneesmiddelen-
commissie). This Drug Board, which is under the supervision of the
Ministry of Health, also has responsibility for the assessment of reg-
istration requests for drugs.33 If it concerns drugs that are eligible
for reimbursement by the mutualiteiten (the Belgian sickness funds),
the price is assessed by the technical board for pharmaceutical spe-
cialities of the RIZIV, the National Institute for Health Care and
Invalidity Insurance, as well. To qualify for reimbursement by the
mutualiteiten, a drug producer has to file an application for acceptance
with the RIZIV, simultaneously with an application for recognition
of the price at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Before a drug will
be reimbursed by the health insurers, it has to comply with certain
criteria stated in the Royal Decree of 2-9-1980 determining the con-
ditions under which the mandatory health care- and invalidity
insurance will be prepared to bear the costs of the pharmaceutical
specialities and of equal products.34 They include pharmacothera-
peutical criteria, society’s interest in the drug, and price criteria.35
Depending on a number of criteria, drugs will be assigned to one
out of six groups that correspond to different reimbursement rules,
stated in Article 15.
Unlike the situation in the Netherlands, substitution of generic drugs
for (more expensive) proprietary drugs occurs very rarely in Belgium.
At the beginning of 2001, the percentage of generic drugs in Belgium
was only 1% of all drugs, while in the Netherlands this percentage
was about 30% (measured in percentage of turnover). Part of this
can be explained by examining the stringent rules with regard to
substitution of proprietary drugs. Article 11 of the Royal Decree no
78, which was added to the text of the decree in 1993 but still has
not come into force for political reasons, provides: “The King deter-
mines, by a decree consulted in the Council of Ministers, the provisos
and the implementing measures according to which the pharmacist
is allowed to substitute a prescribed pharmaceutical speciality by
another, under the conditions that the active components of the sub-
stitute are the same and that the prescriber does not explicitly resist
against such a substitution and that the price for the patient is
cheaper”. Unfortunately Belgian physicians still precribe many
branded drugs and they generally are not so favourably disposed
towards substitution by pharmacists. Moreover, the pharmacists’ asso-
ciation APB admits that pharmacists do not have an incentive to
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substitute, as long as they will earn less on selling a generic medicine
than on selling a branded drug.36
Reimbursement for the pharmacist. Besides the fact that a pharma-
cist has few possibilities to substitute drugs, the margins on drug
sale have been fixed, both for wholesalers and for pharmacists
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999, p. 15). Pharmacists receive a margin
of 31 percent on the sale of drugs, up to a ceiling of 300 BEF ( 7.44)
for every packaging. Because more and more expensive drugs and
drugs in large packagings are coming onto the market, margin erosion
occurs: The pharmacists’ association APB claims that the real profit
margin is only 26.5% per prescription. The explanation for this is
that as much as 40% of the sale of drugs is sold at the ceiling price
or above because of the ever increasing drug prices. The APB fears
that it will become more and more difficult for pharmacists to keep
expensive drugs in stock. Therefore the pharmacists’ association asks
for a marginal margin on the more expensive products.37 However,
if the price structure of medicines in different countries – divided
into the margin for the producer, wholesaler, pharmacist, and gov-
ernment (VAT) – is compared, then it seems that the margin for
pharmacists in Belgium lies at an average level.38
Summary. Summarising, it may be stated that competition between
pharmacists or between wholesalers in Belgium has no influence at
all on the tariffs, given that prices and margins are legally deter-
mined. The pharmacists’ associations, like the umbrella association
APB and the Order of Pharmacists, only function as bargaining
partners and advisory bodies here.
A COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION IN THE
NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM
For the analysis of these different and complex Belgian and Dutch
institutions one could choose various approaches. It seems first of
all interesting to highlight a few similarities and differences concerning
the regulation of pharmacists in the two countries. Then we will
analyse to what extent these complex regulations can be considered
as serving a public interest goal or a private interest goal. In the
final section we will present some quantitative data to illustrate the
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extent to which pharmacists in both countries can be considered as
successful rent seekers.
Differences and Similarities in Regulation
A brief look at the regulation of the pharmaceutical profession in
the Netherlands and in Belgium shows that there are many similari-
ties. While neither of the countries has a numerus clausus for the
admission to the study of pharmaceutics, both countries do regulate
the entry into the profession by registration procedures and rules
with respect to the establishment of new pharmacies. They have in
common that the government protects the professional monopoly of
the pharmacy (the definition of which is about the same in both coun-
tries). Moreover, in the Netherlands as well as in Belgium pharmacists
have to be registered with a regional medical commission, although
in Belgium pharmacists also have to be registered with the Order of
Pharmacists. In the Netherlands the second register for pharmacists
is the public register that protects the title of “pharmacist.” This may
constitute a relatively small difference in regulation. However, a major
difference is that in Belgium the establishment policy with respect
to new pharmacies – including the regulation of takeover prices – is
completely regulated by royal decrees, as opposed to the Dutch
advisory establishment policy of the pharmacists’ association KNMP.
In general it appears that the Order of Pharmacists in Belgium, which
has been called into being by law, has tasks that differ from those
of the Dutch KNMP, the duties of which are not legally prescribed.
However, in both countries the degree of self-regulation is impressive.
In the Netherlands and in Belgium the self-regulatory body of phar-
macists prohibits its members to make the pharmaceutical market
transparent for consumers by means of advertising for the individual
pharmacy. Also the rules concerning the design of the pharmacy and
the exercise of the profession can be found in the self-regulation
rules issued by both the KNMP and the Order of Pharmacists. There
are of course some differences in the content of these rules, but
the overall tendency is the same in both countries. This kind of
self-regulation is obviously restricting competition and inhibits a
differentiation of services. However, this self-regulation of advertising
and exercise of the profession has come under attack recently in case
law, especially in Belgium, but also in the Netherlands.
In the field of drug pricing policy and tariffs there appear to be
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many similarities too. Both in the Netherlands and in Belgium phar-
macists do not have any influence on prices of drugs and on the
tariffs they may ask for their services. However, there are differ-
ences in the pharmacist’s fee: The receptregelvergoeding in the
Netherlands is a fixed amount, while the pharmacist’s margin in
Belgium amounts to a percentage of the drug price. Furthermore, in
Belgium there is no incentive measure directed at the prescription
of cheaper products. On the contrary, a Belgium pharmacist might
sooner be tempted to substitute more expensive drugs for cheaper ones.
Legal provisions prohibit this, but the supervision of this is not always
easy. Also, in both countries health care insurers seem to have an
important influence on the price of drugs or on the fee for the phar-
macist, and thus indirectly on the pharmacist’s income.
A Public Interest Analysis of the Regulation of the Dutch and
Belgian Pharmaceutical Markets
We will now take a brief look at some of the regulations examining
the extent to which they can be considered as serving a public interest
and a private interest goal, respectively. Of course, regulations do
not necessarily exclusively serve either a private or a public interest
goal; a combination of goals is possible. We will therefore ask, rather,
to what extent the regulations serve a public or a private interest
goal. 
The Public Interest Argument: A Reminder
The public interest approach to regulation gives a number of grounds
for regulatory intervention in a market, grounds which have in
common that they are derived from the perceived shortcomings of
the market system itself to deal with certain problems preventing an
economically efficient outcome in a market.39 Four kinds of market
failure are generally discerned: (1) market power; (2) information
problems, e.g., information asymmetry between supplier and buyer
resulting in adverse selection or moral hazard; (3) external effects; and
(4) the presence of public goods. Regarding the pharmaceutical market
especially the information asymmetry argument seems to apply,
although there may also be external effects in that market, for example
as a result of bad medication guidance or wrong drug advice. There
seems to be a clear informational asymmetry between pharmacists and
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patients, because consumers cannot be assumed to have adequate infor-
mation on the quality of the services provided. The services provided
by pharmacists can be called experience goods (the quality of which
can only be determined after having consumed or used it) or maybe
even trust (or credence) goods (the quality of which cannot be assessed
correctly even after consumption of the good) (Nelson, 1970; Tirole,
1992, p. 106). Without regulation there will be adverse selection in
the quality of pharmaceutical services: Bad professionals (quacks) will
drive those who provide high quality services out of the market
(Akerlof, 1970). Therefore informational asymmetry and external
effects may provide a public interest justification for regulatory inter-
vention aimed at guaranteeing a reasonable quality of pharmaceutical
services.
Regulatory intervention differs in the extent to which it intervenes
in a market. In some markets a simple information regulation (in the
form of, e.g., mandatory information disclosure or a prohibition of
misleading advertising) may be sufficient to solve market failure. In
other markets a stronger regulation may be needed, such as prescribed
quality standards or certification and licensing. However, the danger
exists that a regulatory solution to market failure causes misalloca-
tions in other sections of the economy or generates transaction costs
that are bigger than the efficiency gains from the regulation. Therefore
regulatory failure always has to be compared with market failure: Is
the cure (regulation) maybe worse than the disease (market failure)?
In the following section we will therefore discuss whether the tightly
regulated Dutch and Belgian pharmaceutical markets really serve the
public interest.
Analysis. Pharmacists in the Netherlands and Belgium have a pro-
fessional monopoly in the dispensing of prescribed medicines to
patients. Moreover, in the Netherlands the title of pharmacist is pro-
tected by law, so that consumers can only hand in their prescriptions
at a registered pharmacist who has a legally obtained diploma. In
Belgium pharmacists have to have their title formally approved before
entry into the market. Because pharmaceutical services are experience
goods40 (or even trust goods) in a market characterized by informa-
tion asymmetry between pharmacist and patient, some regulation is
necessary to prevent quality deterioration of the kind described by
Akerlof (1970). However, the question arises whether this regula-
tion should take the form of title protection, as is the case in the
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Netherlands and in Belgium. There is a double registration proce-
dure (regional and national) in both countries. The regional registration
is said to be necessary to keep the administration of the number of
pharmacists (in all categories) up to date. The fundamental question
that remains unanswered is whether a far-reaching regulatory instru-
ment such as title protection is necessary to reach the public interest
goal of protecting public health. Other instruments that already par-
tially exist (such as ex ante control of the quality of pharmaceutical
products) could also reach that goal to some extent, without the
negative effects as far as the restriction of competition is concerned.
Indeed, an additional problem is that the specific services of the
pharmacist (such as giving advice) might warrant regulation, but this
is less the case for the sale of prescribed drugs.
Considering the regulation of the establishment of pharmacies the
public interest argument of correction for market failure is even
weaker. Why regulate also the entry into the market for community
pharmacists if there already is a double registration procedure in order
to guarantee good service quality? With respect to the Netherlands,
the KNMP advisory establishment policy must be examined more
closely to provide an answer to this question. In §2.3 the justifica-
tion used by the KNMP for its establishment policy has been
presented: “the financial exploitation of a pharmacy has to be finan-
cially sound, and therefore a minimum number of prescriptions is
needed.” One could ask whether the concept of economic feasibility,
which is based on the desired number of prescriptions, has not been
defined too narrowly by the KNMP, but to determine this will be
very difficult. With respect to Belgium, it is obvious that with the
Royal Decrees from 1974 and 1977 and the recently prolonged mora-
torium, the entry of new pharmacies into the market is regulated in
a very restrictive manner. The explanation for this is that the pharmacy
density in Belgium has always been very high compared to that of
other European countries – and certainly compared to the Netherlands.
The operational and transportation costs of the distribution of drugs
are high too, because there is a large network of pharmacies and
wholesalers and often deliveries are made several times a day to the
same pharmacy. Belgium opts for quick and small-scaled deliveries
and an individual approach to patients, but it has to pay a price for
that in the form of higher costs.41 However, the question remains
whether it is really in the public interest to have guidelines or rules
about the economic feasibility of a pharmacy: Is it after all not up
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to the pharmacist to determine whether he or she thinks it is feasible
to enter the market? Again one has the impression that the tool used
goes much too far in order to cure the information asymmetry. Because
market competition is likely to be severely restricted, in the end the
cure may be worse than the disease.
As far as the regulation of fees is concerned, we can be brief.
Although there are differences of form between the Netherlands and
Belgium, the bottom line is that prices (or fees) are regulated and
that price competition is almost totally excluded. Even if there might
be a public interest argument to give a monopolistic right to phar-
macists to sell some drugs – albeit the question still arises whether
the same goal could not be reached via less interventionist means than
the ones observed in the Netherlands and Belgium – it should at any
rate be possible for them to compete with respect to prices and quality.
However, we have shown earlier that there are no possibilities at all
for pharmacists to compete by prices. In the Netherlands pharma-
cists receive a fixed amount per prescription, in Belgium they receive
a fixed margin on the sale of drugs. Such tight price regulation is
hardly to the benefit of the consumer: There is no possibility to choose
between good service/higher price and little service/lower price. This
absence of choice constitutes the most important problem from a
consumer perspective. According to the present tariff structure, Dutch
and Belgian pharmacists are even inclined to sell as many prescribed
drugs as possible while giving little or no advice, because they do
not get extra money for these time-consuming services. Hence, the
current structure of price regulation in the Netherlands and Belgium
even has adverse effects on the incentives of pharmacists to increase
the quality of their services.
Without price competition as an option, the only way left for phar-
macists to compete with others would be in the quality of services.
But also that kind of competition is seriously restricted as a result
of the regulations we have described, both in the Netherlands and in
Belgium. In both countries there is an almost complete prohibition
of advertising. This prohibition can hardly be said to serve a public
interest goal. It is therefore under serious attack from judges (in
Belgium) and competition authorities (in the Netherlands). The same
conclusion can obviously be reached as far as the highly restrictive
regulations concerning the exercise of the profession in both countries
are concerned. Because in the Netherlands pharmacies have to satisfy
all the requirements included in the Dutch Pharmacy Standards of
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the KNMP, a differentiation in the provision of services becomes
almost impossible. Every pharmacist has to abide by the opening
hours, the requirement to have a separate room for magistral prepa-
ration of medicines, and the requirement to deliver every sensible
prescription. In Belgium, the sixth professional rule defined by the
Order of Pharmacists contains requirements that are very similar to
those defined in the Netherlands. It goes without saying that for phar-
macists the possibilities to compete in quality decrease largely for these
reasons. This is not to say that the possibilities of non-price compe-
tition are totally excluded. It is theoretically still possible to compete
with better services or the offer of a wider range of non-prescription
goods. However, it remains difficult to convey these competitive
advantages to the consumer, given the prohibition of advertising.
Hence, these regulations do not seem to serve a public interest goal
either.
In sum, although there seem to be valid reasons for some kind of
regulation of the services provided by pharmacists, the profession
appears to have “abused” the public interest justification by intro-
ducing all kinds of restrictive regulations, which go much further
(in limiting competition) than the public interest goal would justify.
Hence, the private interest hypothesis might to some extent explain
the intensity of the regulations examined.
A Private Interest Analysis of the Regulation of the Dutch and
Belgian Pharmaceutical Markets
The private interest argument: The rent-seeking hypothesis. The private
interest (or rent-seeking) hypothesis has originated from the well-
known economic theories that share more or less the same approach
towards the formulation of regulation: the capture theory (Bentley,
1908; Hägg, 1997, p. 342; Posner, 1974, pp. 341–342), public choice,
and Stigler’s economic theory of regulation. The rent-seeking hypoth-
esis originates in particular from a number of works written by
economists who are (or were) attached to the Chicago school (Becker,
1983; Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 1980; Buchanan & Tullock,
1962; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974). 
According to the private interest approach interest groups are con-
tinually influencing political decisions in order to seek rents for
themselves. Rent seeking will be most successful if groups are small,
single-issue oriented, and well organized (Olson, 1965). Professional
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organizations seem to fit most of these criteria: They are small relative
to the number of consumers, they are very single-issue oriented, and
often well organized. According to private interest arguments, they are
therefore better able and more inclined to influence regulatory
agencies. Special-interest groups may have such a powerful influ-
ence on politicians that their efforts to obtain regulatory failures
override general preferences (for empirical evidence of rent seeking
by professionals in various European countries, see Faure, Finsinger,
Siegers, and Van den Bergh (1993).
Stigler went even further by stating that regulation in general is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated entirely for
its benefit (Stigler, 1971, p. 3).42 He stated that every branch of
industry, which is powerful enough to do this, will lobby the gov-
ernment for the erecting of entry barriers such as obligatory training
or apprenticeships, product requirements, taxes, import quotas, etc.
The explanation for this lobbying activity is that entry barriers lead
to a decrease in the supply of a given product, which in turn leads
to an increase in the price, and that is of course favourable to the
insiders in the market, viz., the original producers. The same line of
reasoning goes for direct rules of conduct like a prohibition to adver-
tise. Advertising bans lead to a less transparent market where the
prices asked can and will be higher than in a market without adver-
tising bans. 
Becker (1983) points to the fact that regulation can be the result
of competition for political influence among many different interest
groups. In his analysis Becker even unifies the view that govern-
ments correct market failures with the view that they favour the
politically powerful: In his model both are produced by the compe-
tition for political favours (Becker, 1983, p. 384). 
In the remainder of this section, the rent-seeking hypothesis will
be tested by analysing the regulatory frameworks of the pharmaceu-
tical market in the Netherlands and in Belgium.
Analysis. We believe that the Dutch and Belgian regulations
concerning pharmacies provide a strong case backing up Stigler’s
hypothesis that regulation is merely used as a barrier to entry with
the aim of providing rents to the pharmacies. Some aspects of the
regulation in the Netherlands and Belgium we have just discussed
seem to aim at a limitation of competition only. This is, e.g., the
case with the prohibition of advertising. A prohibition of advertising
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will make the market less transparent. Hence, it will become more dif-
ficult for patients to compare service quality between pharmacists.
This seems only to serve a private interest goal. The same can be
said for the regulation of the exercise of the profession (notably the
mandatory design of the pharmacy and related aspects). Of course one
could argue that it may be in the public interest that a pharmacy is
well-designed, but again the regulations in the Netherlands and
Belgium seem to go much further than the public interest goal would
require. It is, e.g., not possible for a pharmacy to have opening hours
only in the evening, or to provide medicines only for specific groups
of patients. A differentiation of pharmaceutical services is hence pro-
hibited by the regulation. This is true both for the Netherlands and
Belgium. 
It is, however, not always clear who are precisely the “winning”
pharmacists in this private interest game. The interests of pharma-
cists may indeed well be heterogeneous. Some may wish to compete
against others in order to gain a larger share of the market, whereas
others may wish to be protected from that competition. It is hence
not a priori clear that all pharmacists gain from, e.g., a ban on adver-
tising. However, the fact remains that many of these professional rules
limit competition and therefore consumer choice. But there again we
should repeat that – as far as prescription drugs are concerned – the
opportunities for consumer choice among drugs is often non-existent
or at least limited to the services that are offered during and after
the sale of the drug.
Also the regulation concerning the establishment of a pharmacy
seems to constitute evidence of the “barriers to entry” hypothesis.
Although there are differences of form between the Netherlands and
Belgium, in both countries the self-regulatory bodies can supervise the
establishment of pharmacies. The argument that a pharmacy should
be “financially sound” (in the Netherlands) and the distance criteria
(in Belgium) only serve to limit the number of market participants,
but do not provide any guarantee for an increased quality of the
services provided. In both cases one can ask whether it is really in
the public interest to have guidelines about the economic feasibility
of the pharmacy or the distance of a pharmacy to other pharmacies.
Again, one has the impression that the tools used in both countries
go much further than the public interest goal to be served. By regu-
lating the entry of newcomers to the market, the “insiders” benefit,
because there will be less competition in the market. Notice that as
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far as the form of the supervision over the establishment is con-
cerned, there are differences between the Netherlands and Belgium.
In the Netherlands the establishment (and limitation) of the pharma-
cies is based on an “advisory policy,” whereas Belgium introduced
a formal moratorium on pharmacies in 1994. However, since in the
Netherlands the contracts between pharmacists and health insurers
are based on the guidelines of the professional body, it will effectively
be impossible for pharmacists in the Netherlands to enter the market
without consent of the health insurer. 
This influence of health insurers (also in the establishment of
pharmacies) in the Netherlands points at the fact that this establish-
ment policy might be in the interest not only of the pharmacists, but
also of the health insurers. This is linked to another element, which
illustrates the private interest character of the regulation, viz., the
regulation of fees and tariffs. Although we cannot discuss the role
of health insurers within the limits of this paper, it is clear that they
have much influence on the drug delivery system. Indeed, in both
countries health insurers have an important influence on drug prices
and therefore also indirectly on the pharmacist’s fee. Health insurers
clearly have an interest in keeping prices of pharmaceuticals and
fees for pharmacists within reasonable limits. This influence of health
insurers therefore provides some support for the hypothesis of Becker
that regulation is the result of a competition for political influence
among interest groups. 
Summary. On the basis of this qualitative analysis of Belgian and
Dutch regulation of pharmacists, one can therefore conclude that
although there certainly is a public interest argument in favour of
regulation, parts of the contents of the regulation are certainly not
in the public interest. The tariff regulation, prohibition of advertising
and the establishment policy seem to go further than what would be
warranted to cure a market failure. This corresponds with the pre-
diction in the literature that a profession will seek to obtain monopoly
profits by using regulation to grant them monopoly rights.43
However, although the regulation clearly is to some extent pro-
mulgated in the interest of the pharmacist, it is also likely that, for
example, the fee regulation is the result of competition for regula-
tion among different interest groups. Fee regulation probably promotes
the interests of health insurers as well.
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AN EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: FIRST RESULTS
It is obviously another question whether the pharmacists in the
Netherlands and Belgium are actually successful rent seekers. That
is largely an empirical question. As far as the contents of the regu-
lation are concerned, pharmacists in both countries appear to be
successful, at least in limiting competition. We will now examine
whether the regulation was also effective in limiting the entry into
the profession. Therefore we will look at the number of pharmacists
(and its evolution) in both countries. In that respect it will obviously
be interesting to relate these developments to differences in regulation
between both countries. In addition we will examine whether these
barriers to entry also lead to rents for pharmacists in both countries.
We will try to provide some evidence on the relative income of phar-
macists and some indication of takeover prices.
The Number of Pharmacies
The evolution over time of the number of pharmacies (community
pharmacies, dispensing physicians and hospital pharmacies together)
in the Netherlands is shown in Figure 1.44 The effects of the KNMP
establishment policy are visible in this figure. During the period in
which the policy was obligatory for KNMP members (1975–1987) we
see a decrease in the number of pharmacies. After 1987 the number
eventually increased again, but it is obvious that also the advisory
establishment policy – enacted in 1987 – was able to prevent the
number of pharmacies to reach the 1970 level of 2,298. The initial
increase was therefore temporary. In 1998 the number of pharma-
cies was only 2,244 (divided into 1,547 community pharmacies, 605
dispensing physicians and 92 hospital pharmacies). 
If we then look at Figure 2, which indicates the relationship between
the number of community pharmacies and dispensing physicians, it
appears that for almost every new community pharmacy a dispensing
physician gave up his or her drug depot.45 In 1982 the number of estab-
lished pharmacists on the market was for the first time larger than
the number of dispensing physicians. It seems that newcomers to the
pharmaceutical market are more or less dependent on the possibili-
ties of “buying out” a dispensing physician or a pharmacist who is
willing to give up his or her practice. 
In a market without population growth this might be nothing to
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really worry about (that is, if the initial number of pharmacies would
have been optimal at the outset), but in the Netherlands, like in all
of Europe, the population has increased enormously during the last
decades. The number of patients per pharmacy increased from 5,834
in the year 1970 until 7,274 in the year 1998, as shown in Figure 3.
While, of course, this presentation of the number of pharmacies
in the Netherlands cannot be explained by the KNMP establishment
policy alone (also the drug policy or the evolution of the profession
itself may be responsible), it does provide some tentative evidence
of rent seeking. Thus these data on the evolution of the number of
pharmacies provide some support for the qualitative analysis presented
above. A comparison with other countries seems necessary to draw
further conclusions, although such an analysis will certainly not be
easy because of the many differences in the regulation of the phar-
maceutical profession across Europe. However, within the scope of
this paper we can of course provide a comparison with the Belgian
situation. 
With the exception of Greece, Belgium has the tightest web of phar-
macies in Europe.46 On average there was one pharmacy for 1,935
inhabitants in 1998. Figure 4 shows that the number of patients per
pharmacy in Belgium decreased between 1961 and 1986, but since
then, while the Belgian population kept increasing, this number has
increased very slowly.47
Figure 5 presents the number of community (established) phar-
macies in Belgium. As opposed to the Netherlands, we see an increase
in this number, although since the mid-1980s the number of com-
munity pharmacies has remained almost constant. It seems therefore
that the public regulations in Belgium did a reasonable job in reducing
the number of new pharmacies. The reason for this regulation of estab-
lishment of pharmacies is different from the one the KNMP uses in
the Netherlands, because in Belgium the government fears an “over-
supply” of pharmacies. Because the number of pharmacists active
on the Belgian market is still very high (much larger than the Dutch
number), it will remain difficult for Belgian pharmacists to open a new
pharmacy.
Although we noticed that today both Belgium and the Netherlands
have strict rules concerning the establishment of pharmacies, there still
are considerable differences between the two markets. Whereas in
the Netherlands in 1998 there were 7,274 patients per pharmacy, the
average number of patients for one pharmacy in Belgium was 1,935.
186 N. J. Philipsen and M. G. Faure
The Regulation of Pharmacists 187
Fi
gu
re
 3
.  
Pa
tie
nt
s 
pe
r 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
in
 th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s.
188 N. J. Philipsen and M. G. Faure
Fi
gu
re
 4
.  
Pa
tie
nt
s 
pe
r 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
in
 B
el
gi
um
.
The Regulation of Pharmacists 189
Fi
gu
re
 5
.  
N
um
be
r o
f c
om
m
un
ity
 p
ha
rm
ac
ie
s 
in
 B
el
gi
um
.
Hence, one could conclude that the Dutch pharmacists have appar-
ently been far more successful in limiting market entry than their
Belgian colleagues. That large difference cannot be explained by
merely looking at the contents of the rules of establishment, which are
today very strict in both countries. One has the impression that the
Dutch started much earlier to limit market entry than the Belgians.
By the end of the seventies, the Dutch (private) regulations apparently
succeeded in reducing an already small number of pharmacies even
further. The Belgian moratorium on the establishment of pharmacies
came only in 1994, when the number of pharmacies was already large.
It succeeded in limiting the growth of the number of pharmacies,
but the average number of pharmacies remains high.
The Income of Pharmacists
Another way of getting an indication of the success of rent seeking
by pharmacists is by examining data on their incomes. The average
income of a profession might give some estimate of its success in
obtaining rents. However, one should be very careful with the inter-
pretation of such data; high incomes do not necessarily emanate from
high rents as a result of rent seeking (e.g., lobbying or self-regulation).
Nevertheless, income data are still interesting if one wants to compare
one profession with others.
Since we just noticed that the average number of patients per
pharmacy is a lot higher in the Netherlands than it is in Belgium,
one would expect that on average the incomes of Dutch pharmacists
would be higher than those of their Belgian colleagues. That is, unfor-
tunately, impossible to ascertain. Data on the incomes of Dutch
pharmacists are extremely difficult to find, not least because a large
part of their income depends on the bonuses and discounts received
from the pharmaceutical industry. We do know, however, that the
average turnover of a Dutch pharmacy in 1999 was 1,810,583 (SFK,
2000, p. 54). The gross profit at this turnover would be 376,638
(according to the SFK), which implies a gross profit margin per
pharmacy of almost 21%. However, this amount is exclusive of
bonuses and discounts. If we add the bonuses and discounts and then
compute the gross profit margin for a Dutch pharmacy, it would be
almost 26%. The average bonuses and discounts per pharmacy are
about 90,756 (according to our own calculations based on numbers
given by the SFK and PriceWaterhouseCoopers).48
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It is difficult to compare these data with Belgian data, since the
Dutch data represent the turnover, which is obviously not the same
as income. However, some comparison between Dutch gross profit
and Belgian incomes may be possible. We will come back to that
below. First it seems interesting to look at the Belgian data alone, since
they allow for some comparison with other professions. In Figure 6
the income of Belgian pharmacists is compared to the income of
three other professions and the income of the average self-employed.49
The numbers show that in Belgium the income of all professions
exceeds the income of the self-employed workers, although the archi-
tects’ income is very close to that of the self-employed. The data
also suggest that the relative income of pharmacists is quite high: Until
the early 1990s, the average income of pharmacists was even higher
than the average income of physicians. The pharmacists’ income is
significantly higher than the attorney’s income as well. Hence, there
is at least some tentative evidence that Belgian pharmacists as a group
might be efficient rent seekers. However, we have to keep in mind that
high incomes do not necessarily result from rent-seeking behaviour,
but may also be, for example, a reward for investments in prolonged
education. However, the average income seems to be substantially
higher than what could be expected as postponed income caused by
longer studies. Hence, a part of this reward can be considered as
rent. A similar conclusion concerning the relative success of profes-
sionals in rent-seeking was reached in an earlier Belgian paper by
Faure and Van den Bergh (1991), based on an examination of data
from attorneys, architects, physicians, and pharmacists between 1982
and 1988.
Unfortunately we cannot compare these nice Belgian data with
Dutch data, since the latter are not available. We do however know
that the gross profit (before taxes, before deduction of costs) of an
average pharmacy in the Netherlands in 1999 was 376,637.50 This
can to some extent be compared to the Belgian data, which provide
income before taxes, but after deduction of costs. If we take the data
provided by SFK on the average costs of pharmacists in the
Netherlands51 and subtract these from the gross profit mentioned
above, the average income of a Dutch pharmacist would be 69,641.
In 1999 in Belgium the average income of a pharmacist was
47,360.52 That the Belgian figure is substantially lower than the
Dutch should not come as a surprise, given the fact that the average
Dutch pharmacy has more than three times as many patients as the
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Belgian counterpart. Moreover, if we would also include the estimated
amounts of bonuses and discounts received by pharmacists in these
computations, the difference would be much larger yet. 
In sum: Even though Belgian pharmacists seem to be successful
rent-seekers at the national level, if one compares their income to, e.g.,
that of a Belgian architect, they do relatively poorly compared to
their Dutch colleagues. Obviously that must to a large extent be due
to the average number of patients per pharmacy. However, one should
be careful in attributing this difference solely to a difference in the
relative lobbying force of the pharmacists in the two countries. It
may well be imbedded in cultural differences as well. The fact that
the Belgian public apparently expects quick service offered by a
large body of pharmacists will also have some influence on the
“optimal” number of pharmacists in a society.
Takeover Regulation
Takeover prices can be considered as a powerful indicator of rent-
seeking as well. The mere fact that goodwill is paid for the takeover
of a pharmacy proves that the pharmacy itself has a value, other than
the value of the real estate, the stocks, etc. Hence, this confirms
Moore’s hypothesis that a license will confer property rights upon
the licensees (Moore, 1961). The practice in both countries shows that
the “license” to operate a pharmacy has a real and high value. Indeed,
it is obvious that the large amounts of goodwill that have to be paid
both in the Netherlands and in Belgium restrict the entry into the
market as well. Even if a pharmacist would be able to establish a
new pharmacy despite the strict establishment rules discussed above
he or she would face the problem of having to pay extraordinary
large amounts of money for goodwill.
Dutch pharmacists who want to set up their own practice by taking
over an existing pharmacy have to pay takeover costs consisting of
housing, stock, and an amount for goodwill. The amount for goodwill
is often very high and is as a minimum equal to the annual turnover,
but often even higher. Considering that as mentioned above the average
pharmacy has an annual turnover of about 1,810,583, it immedi-
ately becomes clear that the average goodwill contributes a substantial
amount. Moreover, in recent years one has seen a considerable increase
in this amount (Jong, 1998, pp. 612–613, and an interview with an
anonymous Dutch pharmacist, 24 July, 1999). Thus it is clear that
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especially for recently graduated Dutch pharmacists it will be nearly
impossible to set up their own practice right after graduation. Also
in Belgium very large sums have sometimes to be paid when taking
over a pharmacy, this despite the regulated takeover prices.53 Due to
the high prices that have to be paid many pharmacies taken over in
Belgium are now bought by commercial chains or private individ-
uals who are not pharmacists. About 20% of the pharmacies in
Belgium belong to non-pharmacists. However, it also occurs that estab-
lished pharmacists buy up pharmacies to form minichains.54
Although we do not have data on the exact amounts of goodwill
to be paid by aspiring pharmacists, already the fact in itself that in
both countries a certain large sum of money has to be paid for goodwill
suggests that there are rents that can be captured by the already estab-
lished pharmacists. 
CONCLUSION
The starting point of this paper was the question of the extent to which
the regulation of the pharmaceutical market in the Netherlands and
in Belgium can be explained as a result of rent-seeking behaviour
by pharmacists or other interest groups. Indeed, we found some
evidence for Stigler’s private interest hypothesis of rent-seeking behav-
iour by pharmacists. In addition, some regulations seemed to be a
result of competition among interest groups for political influence,
as predicted by Becker.
If one looks at the regulatory framework in the Netherlands and
in Belgium, a number of restrictions on competition can be found.
In both countries there is a double registration procedure with title
protection, be it in slightly different forms. Dutch and Belgian phar-
macists have a monopoly of compounding and dispensing of
(prescribed) medicines. Although adverse selection in the quality of
pharmaceutical services seems to justify regulation because of the
informational asymmetry between the pharmacist and the patient, these
Dutch and Belgian regulations go much too far if the goal were only
to promote public interest. The entry into the market (the establish-
ment of new pharmacies) is also regulated in the Netherlands and
Belgium. In the Netherlands there are guidelines issued by the phar-
macists’ association KNMP, which in practice are followed by all
health insurers when they make contracts with individual pharmacists.
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In Belgium the government regulates the entry of newcomers into
the market, as well as the takeover prices of pharmacies. There seems
to be no valid public interest justification for this severe restriction
of market competition in the form of entry regulation. One has the
impression that the tool applied goes much further than to cure the
information asymmetry in both countries. Next to that, in both coun-
tries the self-regulatory body of pharmacists prohibits advertising by
individual pharmacists. Moreover, the Dutch KNMP and the Belgian
Order of Pharmacists have limited the differentiation of services by
individual pharmacists, by having formulated all kinds of provisions
in the rules of conduct and the deontological rules, respectively. It
is obvious that these rules are at least to some extent promulgated
in the interest of the pharmacist. Finally, in both countries the fees
received by pharmacists are completely regulated. In the Netherlands
pharmacists receive a fixed fee for every dispensed prescription, while
in Belgium they receive a fixed margin for every dispensed drug.
Although this regulation does not seem to serve any clear private
interest goals, it is certainly not in the public interest either. Moreover,
this fee regulation may promote the interests of health insurers.
We can conclude that the Dutch and Belgian pharmaceutical
markets are overregulated and not transparent. A qualitative public
and private interest analysis of the regulations in these markets has
shown that some of these regulations can only be explained by private
interest arguments. We also tried to analyse whether differences in
regulation between the Netherlands and Belgium might to some extent
explain the effectiveness (success) of pharmacists’ rent seeking. We
considered the evolution of the number of pharmacists, the (relative)
average income of pharmacists, and the issue of goodwill.
With respect to the number of pharmacies, there are considerable
differences between the Netherlands and Belgium. In Belgium the
number of pharmacies is much higher than in the Netherlands, but
the effect of the establishment policy is visible in both countries.
The reasons behind the establishment policy differ between the coun-
tries, however. In the Netherlands the reason is a restriction of entry
by the incumbent pharmacists to guarantee “financially sound” phar-
macies, while in Belgium the government tries to regulate the
“oversupply” of pharmacies. It follows that the number of patients per
pharmacy in Belgium is also much higher than the Dutch one.
Moreover, in Belgium this number has been more or less constant
(slightly decreasing at first and now slightly increasing) during the last
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decades, while in the Netherlands the number of patients per pharmacy
is low and has always been increasing. One has the impression that
the Dutch started much earlier with limiting market entry than the
Belgians and that they succeeded in reducing an already small number
of pharmacies even further.
The data on the average incomes of pharmacists suggest that Dutch
pharmacists have higher incomes than their Belgian counterparts
(although Belgian pharmacists do relatively well relative to a number
of other professionals in Belgium). Obviously this difference will to
a large extent be due to the average number of patients per pharmacy.
However, one has to be careful with interpreting income data, since
high incomes do not necessarily emanate from higher rents as a result
of rent-seeking behaviour. Also, it is difficult to obtain data on the
average pharmacist’s income (especially concerning the Netherlands)
and the data we found could not be compared with one another without
making some additional assumptions. 
We also considered the “goodwill-problem”. Both in the
Netherlands and in Belgium pharmacists who want to take over a
pharmacy have to pay large amounts of money for goodwill. This
practice shows that the license to operate a pharmacy has a real and
high value (over and above the value of real estate, stocks, and such).
The fact that high amounts of money have to be paid for goodwill
already suggests that there are rents that can be captured by phar-
macists.
Although we found qualitative and quantitative proof for the
arguments put forward by the private interest approach of regula-
tion, the question of whether Dutch or Belgian pharmacists are
successful rent-seekers remains a difficult one to answer, because
plentiful (difficult-to-obtain) data are needed to make strong claims.
Hence, this question remains an open one that is certainly worth further
research, not only within the framework of the countries dealt with
in this paper but also with respect to other countries. 
NOTES
1 Wet van 18 januari 1996 betreffende de kwaliteit van zorginstellingen (Kwaliteitswet
Zorginstellingen), Stb. 80, 1996.
2 See Stb. 20, 1999.
3 Stb. 655, 1993, amended by Stb. 570, 1997.
4 Illegal use of a title protected by this Act can be punished with a fine of not more
than NLG 5000 ( 2269). See Article 100. 
196 N. J. Philipsen and M. G. Faure
5 This norm was not based on financial calculations. It was based on the then existing
subscription system (abonnementssysteem) with respect to pharmaceutical care for
patients of national health services. According to that system, which remained in
force until January 1988, pharmacists received a fixed amount per registered patient
irrespective of the actual drug use. The earnings from this subscription system
accounted for a substantial part of a pharmacist’s gross profit. Since January 1, 1988,
pharmacists have received a fee per prescription: the fixed fee (receptregelvergoeding).
See KNMP (1997, p. 6).
6 See, e.g., Rb. Maastricht, 15 July, 1981, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht, 1982,
p. 88 and Rb. ’s-Gravenhage, 12 June, 1985, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht,
1986, p. 232.
7 These are numbers for the year 1997. The starting point of the calculations is a
disposable income of 40,000 NLG (about 18,151), excluding net living expenses
of 12,000 NLG (about 5,445). For the complete calculation, see KNMP (1997).
8 Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch, 14 May, 1996, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht,
1997, p. 66.
9 Commissie Economische Mededinging, Advies over Ontheffingsverzoek KNMP:
Besluit Marktverdelingsregelingen, brief aan de Minister van Economische Zaken,
23 October, 1997.
10 Stb. 545, 1995.
11 Health Charges Board (College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg). Among the tasks
of this government watchdog body are the supervision and registration of all drugs
(proprietary, parallel-imported, and generic) that have been put into circulation.
12 The Drug Prices Act defines maximum prices for drugs. The Drug Reimbursement
System determines the maximum amount of reimbursement by health insurance funds
for (clusters of therapeutically mutually interchangeable) drugs. Both are updated
regularly.
13 With this a saving of 17.7 million was intended. The underlying idea was
that it is an elementary duty of a pharmacist to dispense efficiently and that there-
fore the incomes from the incentive measure should be included in the calculations
of the fixed fee (MinVWS, 1999a).
14 Split up per product category, 85% of the turnover of an average pharmacy in 1998
was determined by WTG drugs, against 7% by non-WTG drugs, 4% by medical
devices, and 4% by OTC. See SFK (1999, p. 52).
15 B.S. 14-11-1967. Since this is a numbered Royal Decree, it can also change a
law. A numbered Royal Decree works like a formal act.
16 Koninklijk Besluit van 29 mei 1970 tot regeling van de organisatie en de werking
der raden van de Orde der apothekers, B.S. 4-7-1970.
17 Arbitragehof nr. 68/93, 29 September, 1993, B.S. 28-10-1993, 23.557.
18 Article 16 of the Royal Decree no 80 concerning the Order of Pharmacists.
19 Koninklijk Besluit nr. 78 van 10 november 1967 betreffende de uitoefening van
de geneeskunst, de verpleegkunde, de paramedische beroepen en de geneeskundige
commissies, B.S. 14-11-1967.
20 The penalty for the practice of a reserved operation is an eight day’s to six month’s
imprisonment and/or a fine of between 500 BEF and 5000 BEF (between 12.39
and 123.95). See Royal Decree no 78, Article 38 §1. These fines will be raised
by a multiplier (the so-called opdeciemen) to correct for currency depreciation.
Currently the multiplier is 200.
21 Drug Act from 1964 (Wet van 25 maart 1964 op de geneesmiddelen), B.S. 17-4-
1964, Articles 1–3 and 6 §1.
22 A Medical Commission consists of a chairman and a vice-chairman, who are
proposed by the national board of the Order of Physicians and appointed by the King;
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and in addition two members for every medical profession, plus one member for
every paramedical profession (if recognized by the King).
23 Wet van 12 april 1958 betreffende de medisch-pharmaceutische cumulatie, B.S.
20-6-1958, Articles 1–4 and 9bis.
24 Koninklijk Besluit van 25 september 1974 betreffende de opening, de overbrenging
en de fusie van voor het publiek opengestelde apotheken, B.S. 5-10-1974.
25 Koninklijk besluit van 13 april 1977 tot vaststelling van de regels die toelaten
de waarde van de overdracht der apotheken vast te stellen en toezicht uit te oefenen
op deze overdracht, B.S. 28-5-1977.
26 B.S 18-10-1994.
27 Koninklijk Besluit van 8 december 1999 tot wijziging van het KB van 25
september 1974, B.S. 14-12-1999.
28 Hof van Cassatie, 7 Mei, 1999, R.W., 1999–2000, p. 112.
29 Formally the Court of Appeal of the Order of Pharmacists can take a new decision
after a cassation decision. If then a second decision of the Court of Cassation follows,
that one is final.
30 Het Belang van Limburg, Vrije beroepen moeten vrij kunnen concurreren, 24
August, 1999.
31 De Juristenkrant, Na de advocaten, nu de apothekers, September, 1999.
32 NMa, Decision nr. 397/1998. See also later cases on, e.g., notaries (nr. 952/1999)
and general practitioners (nr. 537/2001).
33 Koninklijk Besluit van 3 juli 1969 betreffende de registratie van geneesmiddelen,
B.S. 10-7-1967.
34 Koninklijk Besluit van 2 september 1980 tot vaststelling van de voorwaarden
waaronder de verplichte ziekte- en invaliditeitsverzekering tegemoetkomt in de kosten
van de farmaceutische specialiteiten en daarmee gelijkgestelde produkten.
35 See Article 5 of the Royal Decree of 2 September, 1980.
36 In mid-2001 the Belgian government started an information campaign to promote
generic drugs and lowered the reimbursement of some expensive branded drugs that
have (equal) generic substitutes. However, at the time of writing of this article the
effects of those measures are still unclear. See, e.g., De Standaard, Overheid voert
campagne promotie generische medicijnen (28 May, 2001) and De Standaard, Positieve
reacties op prijsverlaging (20 April, 2001).
37 De Standaard, Apothekers vragen opslag, 24 October, 1998.
38 For Belgium the margin on drugs can be subdivided as follows for the year 1997:
64.7% for the producers, 8.3% for the wholesalers, and 27% for the pharmacists.
See PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999, p. 21).
39 For a discussion of Pareto optimality and market failure, see, e.g, Mamuth (1992,
pp. 119–128; 181–190); Tirole (1992, pp. 6–7; 106–114); Varian (1984, pp. 190–209;
253–262).
40 This is true if one considers the services of a pharmacist like giving drug advice
and medication guidance a specific service. The mere selling of prepacked drugs cannot
be considered a “service” in the strict sense of the word. 
41 Antwerps Farmaceutisch Tijdschrift, 12, 1998, pp. 26–27.
42 Stigler’s theory has been formalized and extended by Peltzman (1976).
43 Shaked and Sutton (1981) provide a model that offers strong support for the
argument that the granting of monopolistic powers to a self-regulating profession is
likely to be welfare-reducing. Gehrig and Jost (1995) conclude in their paper that
even with asymmetric information in a market, self-regulation is socially desirable only
if the regulator values firms’ profits sufficiently highly (the analysis can also be applied
to professionals).
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44 Data sources for Figures 1–3: Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Eurostat and
own calculations.
45 Articles 6 and 7 of the Drug Supply Act of 1958 state that dispensing physicians
may only be established in areas where no pharmacist is established.
46 Het Nieuwsblad, Apothekers willen minder apotheken, 4 November, 1998.
47 Data sources for Figures 4–5: BIGE (1999), Eurostat, and own calculations.
48 We divide the total number of bonuses and discounts by the number of estab-
lished pharmacies and dispensing physicians.
49 Data source: National Institute for Statistics (NIS).
50 Here we do not take into account the crude data on bonuses and discounts.
51 To estimate these costs, we added the figures for practice costs, housing costs,
general costs, computer costs, interest, writing-offs, and car costs presented in SFK
(2000, p. 50) to arrive at an average amount of 306,996.
52 We have to be very careful in interpreting these numbers, because they come
from different sources and, moreover, are rather crude (especially the Dutch data).
However, because the difference suggested here between the average income of Dutch
and Belgian pharmacists is so huge, we can still draw some tentative conclusions.
53 Het Nieuwsblad, Apothekers willen minder apotheken, 4 November, 1998.
54 Antwerps Farmaceutisch Tijdschrift, 4, 1999, p. 17.
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